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Woods: The Old GDR Opposition in the New Germany
niemals den logischen Bruch der Gesamtlüge aufscheinen
lassen durften. So betrog die Staatssicherheit sich selbst und
die Partei, der sie Schild und Schwert sein wollte und doch
letzten Endes nur ihr Papertigerbild zustande brachte.

ahlesbar, alles ist korrekt verzeichnet, aber in eine so abstrakte
Nomenklatur verhüllt, daß man nichts mehr verstehen konnte.
Die z w e i w e r t i g e formale L o g i k der G l a n z z e i t des
Realsozialismus (Hauptfrage ist: Wer wen?) wandelte sich in
das milchige Licht einer Realitätsbeschreibung, in der die
Vorinterpretation so versteckt wurde, daß die Wahrheitsfindung
im Ermessen des sklerotischen Generalsekretärs lag.
So sammelte die Stasi Informationen, die niemals
Informationen sein durften. So ermittelte sie Wahrheiten, die

Taken from Jens Reich: ABSCHIED VON DEN LEBENSLÜGEN.
Copyright (c) 1992 by Rowohlt Berlin Verlag GmbH, Berlin.
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The Old GDR Opposition
in the New Germany
Roger Woods
Aston University, G B

The critical left which was opposed to the old SED has
experienced its own problems. The
Bürgerbewegungen
have not been free of internal wrangling, with the debates
about methods between Bündnis 90 and Neues Forum in
particular threatening to tip over into hostility. In September
1991 Neues Forum considered whether or not to become
part of Bündnis 90 which was busy establishing itself
throughout Germany. Neues Forum decided to to remain a
separate movement, but also decided to fight elections. From
this middle position, Neues Forum criticized Bündnis 90 for
slipping into parliamentary ways and mocked what it saw as
Bündnis 90's long list of disciplinary measures awaiting
anyone who stepped out of line. For its part, Bündnis 90
claimed to be the focal point in the five new Länder for
alternative, ecology and civil rights groups, and it claimed
that Neues Forum was sinking into political obscurity.
Bündnis 90 also tackled the unresolved question of cooperation between groups in East and West Germany. After the
Green's poor showing at the polls, they no longer appeared
attractive partners to groups in the East. Moreover, both sides
were holding out for policies they regarded as essential.
Basically, however, Bündnis 90 seems more willing to
cooperate with other organizations than Neues Forum. At
parliamentary level it has formed Fraktionen with the
Greens, and it clearly has its eye on a good result in the
Kommunalwahlen coming up in the spring of '92.

H o w are the dissidents and critical left-wing intellectuals
from the old G D R coming to terms with life in the new
Germany after losing the role they briefly played at the head
of the opposition movement? What transformations have they
undergone, and what, if anything, have they contributed to
German political life in the post-unification period? This article
looks at some critical left-wing intellectuals' post-unification
discussions on a new Germany which would somehow
embrace the East German experience. These discussions are
interesting in their own right, but they will also be examined
as signs that the critical left has begun to rethink its relationship with the population as a whole. Many of these discussions are conducted in two recently founded journals,
CONstructiv and Utopie kreativ, which see themselves as a
forum for non-dogmatic discussion of contemporary issues,
but with a commitment to socially and ecologically responsible politics. In particular, the journals' East German roots
have made them a forum for consideration of what that part
of the new Germany might contribute to a redefined German
identity.
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It is worth noting in passing that the PDS has failed to
reform itself into a credible alternative left: faced with a
dwindling membership in the East (January 1991: 1.3 million;
September 1991: 180,000), a near total failure to recruit in the
West, rapidly declining support from the electorate, and
mounting debts, it has shown itself to be consistently one step
behind events with its policy changes. Where it does embrace
new initiatives of other groups, the effect can be a downturn
in the fortunes of those groups because of their association
with the PDS rather than with any politically significant united
front. Speaking recently as a prominent PDS member, Hermann
Kant seemed to sum up the feeling of many in the party when
he stated his reluctance to have anything to do with visions of
how society might be. He explained that he once had a few
ideas about how a state should look, but these turned out to
be wrong. Nor did his view of what role the PDS might play
extend beyond being "the place to which people come with
their troubles," a sign that the PDS has tended to end up as little
more than a refuge for those who lost out politically through
unification.
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When it came to interpreting the transition from the G D R
to the FRG, many paths turned out to be dead ends.
Considerable time and energy went into developing the
theory that the West had conspired to take over the East
German reform movement for its own purposes, and dire
warnings were sounded about succumbing to the charms of
capitalism. Yet these had little impact.
A survey of intellectual activity reveals what is in one
sense a healthy interest in Vergangenheitsbewältigung,''
yet
the intensity with which intellectuals looked back was also
an indication of their difficulties in talking constructively
about the present. More recently, there seems to be a further
use for the past in fighting the battles of the present: to
suggest that the people of West Germany should not
presume to cast the first stone. Against the background of
what has been referred to as the "ungezähmte Siegerlaune"
of the old Federal Republic, the West German left has sought
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to deflect its fellow citizens' attacks on East Germans for their
compromised past by going back as far as Auschwitz and
stressing its all-German nature. The superficiality of Helmut
Kohl's recent flying visit there also comes in for criticism, and
the rise of the radical right in eastern Germany is seen in the
same frame as the electoral successes of the radical right in
Bremen.
When it came to looking at what might be worth rescuing
from the old order and bringing into some kind of renewed
Federal Republic, critical intellectuals of the left for a while
found virtue in some elements of GDR social policy.
"Sozialistische Errungenschaften" thought worth preserving
ranged from GDR Frauenpolitik to full employment, official
support given to cultural life, and a standardized educational
system. Yet the shortcomings of these arguments were
quickly and rightly shown up by East as well as West German
critics.
Another attempt to rescue something from the GDR past
was the appeal to an antifascist, humanist heritage based on
solidarity. Yet it has been argued with some justification that
the positive value of antifascism in fact meant little to the
younger generation and was seen rather as another piece of
the old official political culture.
One noteworthy development in critical left-wing discussion has been the return to traditional dissident themes from
the days of the GDR. It was a long-established part of the
dissident left's thinking in the Honecker period that the West
was no model for a reformed East Germany. Rudolf Bahro
saw the capitalist economic system as anarchy, and Robert
Havemann was always critical of the waste of resources
which he saw as an inevitable characteristic of capitalism.
Yet whereas the dissidents of the Honecker period criticized
capitalism from a traditional socialist point of view, attacked
"actually existing socialism" for starting down the same road
as the capitalist West, and offered a reformed socialism as the
only real solution, the critics in the period following German
unification attack the economics of growth but offer only
tentative solutions which are identifiable not as socialist, but
rather as part of what has been termed an "alternative political
culture." Sebastian Pflugbeil of Neues Forum argues that
none of the established political parties is able to offer a
credible strategy for solving the social, economic, ecological,
and legal problems of the day. Jens Reich's particular
concern is population explosion, but he can see no easy
solutions. He only knows that things cannot continue as
before, and he pleads for a fundamental change in ways of
thinking and in society's goals. In particular, the "deification"
of the growth principle has to be abandoned. Reich comments that this conclusion is startling when one considers that
eastern Germany is currently in the process of introducing the
system of ownership which underpins the growth principle.
Wolfgang Leonhard pursues the point when he calls for "new
ethical goals" to emerge from the civil rights movements of
the East, and Vera Wollenberger asks whether the "ecologically ruined" ex-GDR will repeat the mistakes made in the
reconstruction of West Germany, or whether there is a chance
of creating a socially and environmentally responsible industrial society in the East which could even serve as a model for
others. She calls for job creation schemes to help clean up the
environment, and gives the example of transport systems
based on electricity rather than petrol."

as survey results from the Honecker period indicated, tended
to attach considerable importance to a consumer economy.
It remains to be seen whether returning to these themes with
less ideological baggage and at a time of growing recognition
that the problems articulated are not going to go away will
convert into support for the old GDR dissidents in the new
Germany.
A related attempt to construct a GDR identity focuses on
the switch in the population from passive to active politics in
1989 and the idea that the experience of solidarity, debate,
and unanimity in the movement will provide the seed of
something new. Here, the Round Table and the principles
underlying the constitution it drafted—participatory democracy, social solidarity, equality of men and women, environmental awareness—what has been called "die eigene politische
Kultur dieser Revolution" are the focus of attention.
The Round Table's draft constitution did not get off to an
encouraging start, not even making it to the committee stages
when the Volkskammer was still in existence, but in the postunification period it has provided an important stimulus for
a discussion on whether Germany needs a new constitution.
In November 1991 the discussion of constitutional change
was given an institutional framework when a joint constitutional committee was established to recommend changes in
the constitution to the Bundestag and Bundesrat.
Here, the old GDR opposition has had some success in
gaining support from the established political parties, with
some SPD members coming out in favor of "further developing" the Grundgesetz: Heide Pfarr, an SPD member of the
Bundestag, has suggested a mass petition to the Bundestag
to prompt the parties into serious consideration of constitutional reform. Wolfgang Thierse, deputy chairman of the
SPD and a member of the Bundestag, asks why the SPD is not
doing better in eastern Germany. He puts his party's poor
showing down in part to "Parteiverdrossenheit," to the
association of the SPD with the SED via socialism, and to
distortions by their political opponents. But he also argues
that the very concept of a political party is starting to look
outmoded, and the SPD must start to think about changing.
The context in which the SPD originally operated scarcely
exists any more in western Germany and not at all in the East.
Coming from the East himself, Thierse does not have the
years of experience of his West German colleagues and he
points out that he does not slip easily into the role of a
politician. He calls for cooperation between the SPD and the
citizens' movements.
The Kuratorium für einen demokratisch verfaßten Bund
deutscher Länder argues that a constitution should replace
and/or update the Grundgesetz because the Grundgesetz
was provisional in nature; because when it was drawn up,
destruction of the environment could not be foreseen;
because the Grundgesetz lacks plebiscitary elements. (This
point reflects an attempt to recapture something of the mass
involvement in politics which characterized the political
scene in the GDR from late 1989 onwards.) A new constitution might also ban arms exports, and here one can detect a
widening perspective among the old East German opposition
as it ceases to be preoccupied with eastern Germany and
tackles issues which affect German identity as a whole.
The SPD Member of the Bundestag, Herta DäublerGmelin, is committed to a new constitution and has suggested
a Verfassungsrat to consider what it might look like. She
argues that the new united Germany should not simply be a
continuation of the old Federal Republic which has merely
acquired new territory. A Verfassungsrat should consist in
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In these arguments we hear echoes of the dissident themes
of the seventies and eighties which had tended to create a rift
between an opposition which was given to calling for a
"revolution in people's needs" and a GDR population which,
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have left behind positive by-products does seem to be
acquiring substance and durability.
In the post- Wende period Ina Merkel, co-founder of the
Unabhängiger Frauenverband and representative on the
Central Round Table, takes up this line of argument when
she detects a largely undeveloped, collective sense of
solidarity which came about against the background and
partly as a result of non-participatory political life in the old
GDR, and she refers to it therefore as a "Notgemeinschaft."
The new feature of left-wing intellectuals' thinking is the
attempt to establish contact with a wider audience in a way
which does not involve educating this audience, let alone
criticizing it for not seeing things their way: Merkel operates
on the level of perceived characteristics and notes the
endurance of traditional, handed-down behavior and the
everyday way of life -— both among those who have stayed
and those who have gone, and she concludes that East
Germany is not adequately described by reference to its
repressive characteristics (13)-

equal proportions of men and women, and it should not only
be made up of members of parliament. Within two years, it
should present a draft constitution to be put before parliament
and the people in a referendum. Däubler-Gmelin makes the
link with the GDR's experience of mass involvement in
politics explicit when she refers to the slogan "Wir sind das
Volk," but she also argues that such sentiments are just as
appealing to many in the old Federal Republic and that some
West Germans have been considering constitutional reform
for many years. Däubler-Gmelin favors a federalism which
would involve decentralization of decision-making from the
European level through individual nations and down to their
constituent parts. For Germany, she favors a clear commitment to peace, e n v i r o n m e n t a l p r o t e c t i o n , and an
acknowledgement at the constitutional level of the right to
work and to decent housing. She concludes by spelling out the
relevance of these issues for the question of what remains of
the old GDR: East Germans used to feel inferior because of
their economic weakness. Now they are being made to feel
inferior when they are told that the last forty years were a
scandal which left behind nothing of importance. For DäublerGmelin the discussion of a new constitution is somehow part
of an attempt to end what she refers to as a "pseudocolonization" of eastern Germany.
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This approach, which highlights those features of GDR
society which were unintended by-products of the old
system rather than its imperfectly realized goals, is also taken
up by Michael Brie at the Humboldt University. Brie asks
whether a way of life which was not dominated by money,
competition, and hard economic facts of life ("Sachzwänge")
could really be dismissed as no more than the oppressive
reverse side of the system created by the SED.
The intellectuals who put forward these ideas concede
that their earlier ideological concerns were not widely
shared. The new direction left-wing discussion has taken,
however, is making new claims which are based not so much
on shared convictions but rather on what is claimed to be
observed everyday reality.
So how accurate is this perception of everyday reality?
Public opinion surveys suggest that the features of the GDR
which had helped develop a degree of attachment to it
among young people came to be regarded in less high
esteem once German unification had become a possibility.
O n the other hand, surveys conducted in 1990 indicated that
more than three quarters of all East Germans feared an
increase in egoism in people's relationships with each other
following the collapse of the old order and the uncertainty
over the new. Surveys suggest also that what has been
termed "Solidarität im kleinen" is perceived by East Germans
as more in evidence in East Germany than in West, and it has
been suggested that this is a basic value which East Germany
could bring into the united Germany.
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Surveys of public opinion are not clear on the issues raised
by the Kuratorium: one 1990 investigation conducted by the
Free University in Berlin into what Germans thought of direct
democracy as it exists in Switzerland concluded that, whereas
more than 50% of the population was in favor of it, in the
Bundestag 80% was against it. Yet other surveys suggest that
these ideas do not meet with the approval of the East German
population: first indications are that the majority prefers
political leadership by an elite. Moreover, surveys confirm
that, whereas most East Germans thought an organization
such as Neues Forum was necessary to bring about change in
the first place, by the summer of 1990 there was less need for
such a group.
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The exception here is probably concern for the environment, with surveys showing widespread concern among the
former G D R population on this issue. Also, some of the
participants in the debate on a new constitution for the whole
of Germany, even while attacking the advocates of a new
constitution for seeking to "smuggle in left-wing policies by
the back door," agreed that the current political system in
Germany encouraged short-term thinking of a kind which was
unlikely to meet the ecological challenges of the future.
The "political culture of the revolution" does seem to be
occupying a place in the political life of united Germany and
gaining some support from established groups in the West.
Moreover, in the East, each of the five new Länderhas to work
out its own constitution; and against a background of disappointment with the performance of the major political parties
and a recognition that East Germany's political culture is
different from that of West Germany, there are many signs that
the Round Table's draft has influenced discussions at the level
of the Länder. Regional studies also indicate that in local
elections, groups such as Bündnis 90 achieved some considerable success, w i t h many activists in the original
Bürgerbewegungen
now serving as local politicians.
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When asked whether anything valuable remained of the
old GDR, Martin Walser pointed to the East Germans'
experience with the old political system and their experience
with the new political system. He sees the difference
between the two experiences as the source of a "constructive
contradictory spirit, a spirit which is more difficult to manage
than the sterility of an affluent society." There are many
signs that the old GDR opposition has something of this spirit
and is establishing a representative role for itself in the new
Germany.
33
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Endnotes:

A further attempt at reorientation was made over the
concept of Gemeinschaft. Although it runs the risk of being
thrown out with the old ideological bathwater, and revelations
about the extent of many citizens' involvement with the Stasi
have created antagonisms which could undermine the notion
of a community, the idea that the East German experience may
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Whose Revolution Was It? Stalinism
and the Stasi in the Former GDR
Marc Silberman
University of Wisconsin, Madison

even imagine anything other than real existing capitalism as
the goal of human development. Those who do insist on
alternatives are branded as Utopians or as Stalinists in
disguise, a distinction which some would no longer even
allow.
During the last three months of 1991 I have been living in
Berlin with the express interest of observing closely the
consequences of what it means to have lost the collective
project of socialism, particularly among intellectuals and
artists. In what follows I will try to provide an initial
description of what I perceive as some of the coordinates and
constraints in the discussion that is just getting underway. In

The collapse of socialist governments in Eastern Europe
has led to a situation full of ambiguities. At last it seems to be
possible to talk openly, to name the mechanisms of social
control, to document injustice and state criminality. At the
same time, the political and economic insecurities resulting
from the disintegration of familiar social structures have
narrowed the public's tolerance of alternatives to the ideology of market consumerism and Western parliamentary
democracy. It has become practically impossible to assert or
https://newprairiepress.org/gdr/vol18/iss1/5
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